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Summary
An obvious ."requirementfor a language understanding system
of practical use ia that the system tells "the truth and.only
the trith", and. so·called "intensionality" of natural languages
is one ot the'main obstacles on the way to·tormulate a strict
definition of truth for natural langueges. Alt~ough it may be
possible to accoUnt for it using the apparetua ot to~mal logic,
in the present state of art it aeems more useful to describe
thie property ot natural· languages in the terms of computar
science. The peper presents the problem of intensionality,.
shows its relation to some aapects of programming languages
and outlines the way in which the'intensionality is to be
accounted for in the "multiple environments model ot natural
languege" which is being developed by the author.
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Introduct'ion
Computetional linguistics has already achieved such a steee
of development that it is feasible to construct systems cepable
of conversing with humans on subjects restricted to narrow,
specific domains. Although there is still much to be done es
far as efficiency and other features are concerned, it seems to
be the time for considering the problem of ~eliability in strictly
logical sense, i.e. the problem of truth. The importance of the
trustworthiness of a system can be hardly underestimated. The
problem of truth has been discussed by philosophers since centuries;
one· of the fundamental difficulties e~countered by them on the way
to deflne preciaely the notion of truth was so called intensiona-
lity of natura l languages. There are severel asnects of in~ensio-
·nality. The post discussed one is the faet that there are senten-
ces which change .their logic~l value to the opposite when a s~b-
expression'of such a sentence is substituted by nnother expres~ion
but with the same referent.
The present paper aims at explaining the nature of this end
similar facts in the framework of the multiple environments model
of natural fanguage which is being developed by the author. The
.basic ideas ot.this approach h!ls been presented in (Bień "97'5)
and (Bień 1976); the reader ia not assumed to be familier with
those papers.
~he problem of intensionality
The-problem of intensionality has teen introduced into the
modern philosophy ot language by Frege (1892). He suggested to
distinguish the ~ (meaning, in German "Sinn") and the~-
tation (nominatum, in German "Bedeutung") ot ę name and he noti-
ced thet for the truth-values of 80me sentences both the sense
and the denotation of their constituents are relevant. He used
"the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star" '8S an example óf expres-
sions which h8ve the same denotetiona (ioe .•the planet Venua)
but ~iffer in their·senses; therefore the problem is also .known
as the paradox ot the MOrning.Star and the Evening Star. Frege's
solution.was to recognize sentences which create the "oblique
context", and to assume that a denotation of a name in en oblique
'p •
context consists of its sense. In other words, substitution of
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a nan:e in en oblique context by a na~ wi th the same proper
denotation does not chenge the truth-velue of the sentence in
question onl;}!il' the nemes has elso identical senset<• 'l'hisis
quite a good rule-of-th~~ fer hendling "oblique sentences",
but unfortunately the notion ot sense is still very difficult
to formalize; this made some philosophers to reject Frege's
theory. Amor~ them was Bertrand Russell, who discussed the pro-
blem ot intensionality first in (1905), formulating his famous
exem~le (referring to en authentic fsct), quoted here in the
version of Churc~ (1565:5)
(l) U~orEe IV once demended to know whether Scott was the
author óf "WaverleJ,lI.
(2) George IV once demanded to know whether Scott·was Scott.
Ii is evident t ,,:a t (1) and (2)has ditferent tI".lth-values,
althoueh the cnly difference between them consists only in the
suhsti tution ot tlle expression "the author of il'everl?-y"for an
expression witi> 1he SEll,el1i!nctation, i.e. "Scott". ?ussel dev·e-
l~pec ~ radically different theory to ac~ount for the facts
pointed out :-y ?rege; this theory was applied e .g, i.n "Principia
ł.:athemaUce" ("Nhitehe e.d, Hussel 1910). In this YiOr~ some prc-
perties of a fur,ction of propositionel functions has been
uefined (1910:72), Cne of them, called extension~lity, consisted
ot:the possibility te substitute thi! arguDents ot a function by
ar.y "formall;y equivalent" C.• e, possessing the seme der-otetionl
expressio~s. lhe prorerty ot beir~ no~-ey.tensional was ~alled
intensionality; the terc is derived from the LaUn wo:'d "intensic"
i.2. "meeni:Jg", "content". As far as l ~now, this is t:Je f'irst
use ot thi! term "intensionality"; the term nas becom" pC;::.ila:-
anc. it:'s useu also in other languages (e.g. Polish "intensjo-
nel~o~ć"), altr.ough not always in exactl~ che s~~e sense. I usa
it in the sense of Russell as generalized by Ajd~kie~icz (1967:63)
"l'he expression 3, which conta.ins no free variabIes , is en inten-
sionsl expression it it can be transformen into s nen-equivslent
expresr:ion::; ty replscine; one of its meJr.!::ersby an expression
which i8 equivslent wi-th that member".
'''l'hexpressicn E, which contains ene or more free variabIes ,
ia an intensional expression if two non-equivslent expressions
can be obtsined from it by substituting for each of these varie-
bles two dif:ferent but e(~uivalent constant expressions",
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The eąuivalence of expressions is understood hera as the
eouality oi denotations and "member'" means a sub-expression
.recognized in a given expression accordine to the rxles of
syntax.
BecauBe of the lack of formal apparatus suitable to
handle intensional expressionst the effort was first of all
devoted to avoiding them in foroal languaBes beine construct-
ed as well as in formal analysis of natural lanBuaees. Jt
resulted in statir~ more and more subtle conditions sufficient
for preserving the truth velue of en expression d~rin6 sub-
stitutions for its member •.One of the early a~proaches (e.g.
Carnap 1934) consisted in treating the entire ~hrese i~ the
oblique context as e nama; it means prectically disallowine
sny substitutioo in such a context, beceuse every aheoge i~-
side it eenerates quite a new name. Thie wes obviously not
adequetet because it gave no clue why sentences·usually pre-
serve their truth values if tile substi tution doeo: r:0t c!:E:nc:;e
the senbe of e member. This irtadequacy wes realized eerly by
~uine (1953) who stated more carefully that such phrases sre
only similar to names created by ~ans of quotation marks;
the similerity conaists in the "referenr.ielly opac;.ue"us'" of
the names in both cases t while outside the "opeque contexte:;"
the names are used "purely referentielly". Quine did not'
'suegest any solution of his o~ntand his treatment of exs~ples
was rather simplicistic. In particulart he ~dp. strong end
sometimes strange assumptions about the persons mentioned io
examplest e.g. he said «(,luine1953:141) thet'
(3) Philip is unaware that Cicero denounced Cetiline.
is "no do~bt false". SimilarilYt he co~siden!d
(~) Philip believes that the capital of Honduras ia in
.Nicaragua.·
to be always false, while at lea~t three interpretation5 of (4)
allow' it to be true. First,.Philip may be a'child, who does
not know that a cepital of 8 country always i5,on the territary
of the country. SecondlYt 'Philip may not ~ aware that Honduras
is a country end not a province of Niceragua. The third inter-'
pretation ia disputablet but it is p055ible to use (4) to tran-
smit the relevant part of the message
(5)Philip believ~s that Tegucigalpa i5 in Niceragua
to a person with poor knowledge of'geogre~hy, where the r~levant
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part is that Phllip has a highly erroneou8 belief abOut some
important town.
AD attemp to formul~e a relatively precise criterion for
allowing and disallowing substitutions in oblique contexts, was
made by Carnap (1956, cf•.Pelc 1960), who introduced the notion
of intensional isomorphiam, defined in the tollowing way
(1956:56): "if.two sentences are bullt in the same way out of
designator~ such that any two corresponding designatora
are L-equivalent, then we say that.the two sentence5 are inten-
sionally isomorphic". By the L-equivalence of designatora Climap
means that the equality of objects designated by tliemfollowa
from the rules of the.given language, and ~s not the matt'er of
empirical facts (in other worda, the L-equivalence is a special
case of synonimy). Carńap applies the notion to one of the mo~t
important type of intenaional aentencea, i.e. tó belief-aenten-
cea of the type:
"John believea ·that D" in language S
which are explicated in the following way (1956:62):
"There is a sentence 51 in a semantic system S· such that
a) s1 in S' ls lntens10nally isomorphic to D in S and'
b) John is disposed to an affirmative responae to a1 as a
sentence ot ·S"'.
In the above-g~ven explication Carnap aimed at two goals. The
first'one was to account for caaes when John does not know
language S; it was achieved by introducing the semantic system S'..' -The seconilgoal was to reflect the fact that we are not permanen- -
tly aware of ~l our beliefs; however, the formulation,"1a dispo-
sed to an af(irmative res~onse" doea not" 1n my op1nion, solve
the problem.
Prom the explication it follows that a condit1on sufficient for
preaerving the trUth-value after the substituiion of D' for Dis:
.if "John belleves tha~ DR .is true and D' le intens10nally
isomorphic wlth D then ·John believes that D'· ls alBo true.
carnap's (1956) method la mu.chbetter aproxlmation of the solutlon
than that of (carnap 1934) and (Cluine1953) but 1t ls still unsa-'
tisfactory. What we would really like to have ls the conditlon
both sutticlent and necesaary. From the following example, quoted
after Ajdukiewicz (1959),1t can be seen that none ot the above-
mentioned 8~lutions, including that ot Frege, states the necessary
condition for changing the trutlivalues of aentences:
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(6) Caesar knew that Rome 11es on the Tiber.
~7) Caesar knew that the capital ot the Republic lies on
the Tiber.
The sentences (6) and.(7} are both true, although the respect1ve
elauses in the obllque context are ne1ther intensionally
lsomorphlc.nor have the same sense.
Thą problem'of'sufflcient and necessary condition for preserving
the truth.value durlng a aubstltutlon ls only one aspect of
lntenslonallty. ADother, more subtle one is related to the
amblgulty of lntenslonal sentences. The ambigulty was already
noted.by Russell (1905) who distinguished primary and secondary
use of a denotlng expresslon. In the primary use
(s) I thought your yacht was larger then it iso
'meantl
(9) The dimenslons'which I thought your yacht had are
greater then the dimensions which your yacht really has.
while in'the seeondary use, which ls assumed in the ironie an~ler
(10) No, my yacht is not lar;er then lt ls.
the sentence 8 ls understood as .
~11J I thought that the dlmenslons of your yacht are greater
tqpn the dlmensions of your yacht.
The ambiguity was rea1.1sed later by Quine who dlscussed
(1-960:142) two lnterpretatlons of the sentence
l12) The commissioner ls looking for the chalrman o' the
hospi tal board.
If the dean ~ recent appolntment and unknown to the eommissioner
is the cha1rman ot the hospital-board, the sentenee \12) is
eonsidered respectively as equlvalent or not equivalent to
\13') The ~omm1sSioner ls looking for the dean.
Ajdukiewicz \1959, 1961) argued that .such ambiguity is systematic;
he attrlbuted two lnterpretations, wl th the truth value
respec~iTely true'and 'talse, even to the sentenee
.(14) Caesar knew that the capltal ot the Popes lies an the
Tiber.
McCawley (1967) also consldered the ambigulty to be systematie;
he eorrectly reeogn1zed lt as a caSB ot the "de re" and "de dieto"
dlstinetion, applied usually to medal sentenees. The distlnetion,
whieh was lnt~daeed ln Mlddle Ages, can be traced baek to
Arlstotle, who has discussed the following examples, ąuoted after
(Kneale 1~62):
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(.15)It ls possible for a man who ls sittlng to walk.
l16) It ls possible for a man who is not .writing to .•••rite.
The faet that the "de re" and "de dieto" distinetlon may be
applied also to non-modal sentenees was illustrated by McCawle!
in the tollowing examples:
(17) Boris s~d that he didn't kiss the girl who he kissed.
(18) Willy said that he has seen the woman who 11ves at 219
Hain St. but the woman he bad ln mind really lives in
Pine St.
\'19) Willy said that he has seen the woman who iivę.sat 219
Main St. but he doesn't know that she 11ves there.
:10stot the authors mentioned above attributed the amblqul ty
to the two difterent readirigs ot the verb, the rest of them 4id
not dlscuss the problem at all.
~he essential progress was made by the works of Montague
(:'!ontattUe19'72, Thomason 1974); he realised that intenslonali ty
ls an instr1n9ic feature ot natural language and it is useless
to try to avoid it. In conseouence, he developed.s formal
intensional lan~~age BUch that natural language expressione ean
be translated into it. As-it has been noticed by Hintikka
(1973:209), the ~ontague grammar accounts correctly for th~ "de re"
versus "de dieto" ambiguity, allowing the 2n_fold amblguity for
a sentence with n noun phrases in the scepe ot an obligue context.
Actually, the grarmnarhandles properly also nested obligue co.ntexts;
allowing e.g. 3 nouń phrase interpretation!or a noun phrase
• embedded in two obllgue context (ł,ukaszewiez 1982). Our.arg-.lments
against the Montague's approach are of three k1nds. Flrst, the
Monta~~e ~rammar does not aeeount tor all the amblguitles, because
1t does not allow to split a complex noun phrase into dlfferent
possible words; cf. the d1scusslon of (32) below. Secoudly, 'all
present-ctay logie approaches to natural language does not explicate
correctly the not10n oi belięf: 1t ls always assul!ledthat lf A
believes that X and X is logically equivalent to Y, then A belleves
that Y. Aetually,.there may be several reasons why A, who ls aware
óf X, ~ill not be "desposed to an affirmative response" ·to Y;e.g. the lnference requl:ed may be too sophlst1eated.or tlme-
-consuming. -Last but not 1east, although the task of constructlng
a model ot naturlti language expressed in form logie ls very
appealing, I sm afraid that 1t ls not feasible as yet. ~t should
be remembered' that e.g. in mathematlcs there.were 'centuries ot
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research before theoretically solid foundations of mathematics
have been succesfully created. Therefore, although the research
in formal lin~istics is not to be neglec"ed, the nain effort
shculd be aimed rather at the linguistic models of immediate
practical importance. As the conceptu.aI framework for such a
model I propose computer science, and one of the reasons is the
intensionality.of programming languages.
In the present paper we will limit aur discussion to the above
listed cases of intensionality, because they are crucial o~es
and every adequate solution of these problems in easily ex"e~sible
to cover also "names wi th empty denotation", "quantifying in". and
other similar problems.
·Intensionalitv of nrcgr~ing languages
The Ajdukiewicz definition of intensionality is relativp. to
the notion of equivalence. It is Quite natural to consider t~o
progr~ine language expressions as extensionally ecuivalent if
and only if they deliver the same value when evaluated.
Evaluation of an expr~ssion is always performed in same
enviro~~ent (Wegner 1968), which specifies variables which can te
accessed d~ring the evaluation and the values of these variables.
Most expressions are ~, i.e. they contain free variables an=
therefore they are sensitive to the environment which the~ are
evaluated in. On the other hand, environments are also se~sitive
to expression evaluation because the values of variables may
be changed during the evaluation; such a change is called the
side-effect of the evaluation. Obviously, twa ex"ensionally
eouivalent expressions may differ in their side-effects. Fer
example, the following twa expressions of Algol 68 (Lindsey,
Meulen 1971) both evaluate to 4, but differ in their side-effects;
the first one sets the variable i to 4, the second one - to 2.
(i := 4)
\i .:= 2)02
Naw it is intuitively elear when a programming language ex~ressic~
is intensional. It is sufficient for it that there exists at leas~
one open subexpression which is preceded by at least one subexpree
sion. Let us call A the open subexpression, an~ B the subey.pres-
sion preceding it. If we substitute a new expression C for B, and
C is extensionally equivalent to B ~~t it has differer-t side-
-effect on;he very variable to which A is sensitive, then the who-
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le expression will change the value; that means that the expreEslon
is'intensional~ It 13 not easy to tormalise the rule given ab?ve;
establishing for a given expression to which variable it ls
sensi-tive or which variable is atfected by it. may require the
analysis of many poasible flowa ot· control during the eva-
luati~n ot the expression. This task reaembles to some measure
-the "stop problem" and it is quite possible that in general the
problem ot intensionality is in this eense undecidable.
Nevertheless, tor practical purposes it is sufticient to d1scuss
only special cases ot the problem. e.g. the case ot euch expres-
sions tor which only one·flow ot control is·possible. I shall
- -calI ~~ch expressions non-alternatin~. For the sake of simplicity,
it is reasonable to demand that the eXpreśaions under consideration
are also non-redundant, i.e. that every variable influences the
vall1e of the expression. For the non-al ternating and non-redundant
expressions it is possible to recognise statically the relevant
properties. In particular, it i~possible to establish the in~~t
and outuut nomeclatures of the expression. By the nomencla~~re
ot an expression I mean alI names ot variabIes, procedurea etc.
contained in it; by the nomenclature ot the program point occupied
by an expression I mean alI the names accessible by the expression.
By the lnput nomenclature of an expression I mean all the names,
whlch are used to pass values to the expression under conaideration;
by the outnut nomenclature I mean the names or all objects \ usually
variabIes) which receive a va~ue during·the expression evaluation.
We need addltionally the notion ot the sensitivity nomenclature ot
a subexpression of a given express;on or a respective program point
it is the union ot the input nomenclatures ot alI those subexpres-
sions. which a~e to be evaluated atter the subexpression under
consrderation.
For example, in the Algol 68 closed clause
( in.! i.j,k;
v.: ..j+k)+(i+10)'" k
)
the nomenclature ot the program point occupied by the expression
(i:cj+k) conaists in the variabIes i,j and k; its sensitivity
nomenclature - in the variabIes i and k; the input nomenclature
ot the expresslon conaists- in the variabIes j and k. its output
nom~nclature - in the variable i.
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Let A be a non-alternating and non-redundant expression, X
a non-alternating and non-redundant subexpresslon or A. y another
non-alternatlng and non-redundant expression, and B the expreseion
obtalned from A by substituting Y for X. If the nomenclature ot
the program point occupled by Y centains the nomencla~~re of Y,
then lt is posslble to evaluate Y sUccestully and to check whether
X and Y arii!e~tenslonally equivalent. I.f the values or X and Y are
equal. then the expressions A and B are extensionally eąuivalent
on the following condltion. whlch is both sufficient and necessary,
Ii the name oi a variable belo~s both to the input nemen-
clature of Y and to the sensitivity nomencla~~re ef the
program point occupled by X, then its value after the evalua-
tlon oi Y ls the same as its value after the evaluatien ef l.
In other words, ·if the value ot a variable' ls changed as a ~ide-
-effect of the X evaluatlon and th1s side-effect is relevar.t for
the evaluation of the rest of A. then the evaluation of Y sho;;ld
produce the same side-effect on tnis variable to ensure the
eouality of values delivered by the evaIuatlons of A and B.
For example, ~~bstl~~ting for li:=j+k) the expression ~1:=j+k+1;j+k)
will change the value of the clause under consideratlon, while
BUbstituting for it the expression \.i:=k+j~ will .~reserve the
value.
The programming languages used for Artificial Intellig nce
research have specific primitives for environments manipulation,
like contexts of associative data bases or fllters of pattern
matching procesaee. The notions introduced above can be easily
redefined a180 for these languages; therefore we can use our
rule for preserving the value under a subatitution also for
expreaslona coded ln s~ch Ian~~age5 as e.g. P~Ał~3R, QA4 etc.
(Bobrow,'Wegbreit 1974).
Mul titlle environmenta model of natllral lapguage
There.is a widely accepted assumption that a aentence refers
directly to some state of affairs in th~ real world, and or.ly
in a.secondary way carri~a some informatlon about the sender.
This assumptlons underlies e.g. the Morris (1938) de!in1tion of
syntic~ics, semantlcs and pragmaties. where semantics is just the
intermediary stage between sYptax and pragmaties. In reality an
utterance transm1ts exclusively som e data ~bout its sender, in
particular about his beliefa or pretenae~ We interprete an
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utterance as a description of some aepects of the real world
only on the basis of additional aseumption, ~.g. that the sender
is in a position to know the facts described "in the utterance,
that he does not Iie etc. Therefore it is quite conceivable that
a theory of language is divided into syntactics, pragmatics and
semantics in this very order, where "semanttcs is considered as
the description of'general aspects of śpeech acta performed
according to the ruI es of pragmatics.
C'ne ot the !:lalnfeaturee of the lIlultiple environments model
(Bień 1976a) is that it is based on this way of thinking about
comw~nication acts. It means in pr~ctice that we are to keep
track of the beliefs and their changes for alI the participants
of"thę communication act. For every utterance we have to consider
at least the state of minds of the sender and the addresseej'in "
some cases lt is necessary to take into account also the state
of minds ot persona mentioned in the utterance. As we tollow the
approach of Davies and Isard (1972) of treating utterances as-
programs, the minds of persons are represented by different
environments in the computer science sense. The process of
understandlng an utterance ia treated as the evaluation of the
atterance in respective environments. The meaning ot an utterance
ls represented as some relationships holding between some objects.
Tne s~rface representation of a "relation lusually a verb) I shall
calI the ~ivot, and the representations of objects (usually nouns
or noun Phrases) I shall calI desi~ators. The objects in ouestion
may be inages ot real ph~sical objects as well as abstract or
fictitious notions. Designators can be e{ther elementarz or
comDound. STery desTgnator has its meaning. i.e. a procedure
rer.resenting the characteristic ~unction ot the set ot its deno-
tations. The meaning ot a desigr~tor can be assigned to it in
several ways.
In every society there are some objecta of great importance for
it, and th~s causes the need for designators referring to these
objects. The meaning of such designators has to be rather sta~lej
u6ually alI the society members know it. and the great part ot
~uch designators is learned ii the óhlldhood. On ~he.other hand.
objects important enough for a society to deserve their own
desi~nators uBUally are numerous members ot relatively homogenous
classes; in BUch cases the meani~~ of the qesignator consists in
listing the characteristic teatures oi the whole class~ These
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deelgnators are.traditlonally called co~~n names and they form
the majorlty or the desi~ators used in natural languages.
Common names have two uses , relatively clearly separated. They
can 'be used to refer to a partlcular object or" the class, or to
.any object ot lt. The firet use is often called referential,
and the second one attributive; The phenoroenon ls also refered
to" as the speclflc versus non-specific distlnction.
For example "
(20) Jack wanted a kitten.
may mean that Jackwanted a particular kitten, e.g. that owned
by Bill, or that Jack wanted śo keep any kitten he could get.
Slmllarly, in the utterance
(21) The electrlc lamp ls a.useful invention.
""tbe electric lamp" may mean a particular device talked about,
or the whole class of electrlc lamps.
We account. easily"for the dlfferenee between referential and
attrl~~tlve use of designators, assuming that"the meaning of
a designator ls evaluated in an incremental way. By the
lneremental evaluatlon"I mean such a proeess of eomputation,
whleh may be suepended any tlme when some prereąuislte condltions
are not fulfilled. If the evaluation of a designator ls
completed, then we have a case ot its referential use. If the
evaluatlon is not even started for some reasons, then lt ia the
case of strictly attri~~tive use.
Besides of common names there also proner names. Following
Krlpke (1972), we consider the neeessity of fixing the referenee
to be the 'essential feature of proper names. Beeause proper
nam~s usually refer to objects or persons not known by the
majority of the society, they.do not ~ave any generally aceepted
meaning. If we are to understand e.g.
(22) John has come.
we need to have the referent of "John" already fixed. To be
strict, "John" has some resldual meaning, which ls avallable
even completely out ot context: that lt designates an object
referred in some milleu by "John", that the object is probably
called "John", that lt is probably haman and probably male.
Thls explains why lt is sometimee reasonable to use proper
names attrlbutlvely, e.g.
~23) Mount Everest is.Chomolungma.
If an indivldual ls "largely known In the society, then his
proper name may have quite ricn meaning, -which situates i t on
the borderline between proper and common names, like e.g.
"Napoleon" in
\24} He is a 11ttle Napoleon;
AlI the above discussion of elementary designators is basically
valid also for compound desigriators, usually called descrlptions.
They are usually created ad hoc, although some ot them are
lexicallsed proper names, e.g. Holy Roman Empire, or eommon
na~es, e.g. "letter-box". They can be used both attributlvely
and referentlally, e.g.
l2S') The ?mith munderer ie insanę.
may concern a particular person quilty ot the murder or it may
concern anybody who hae murdered Smith.
The evaluation of compound deeignators is additionally compl.1ca-
ted, because ,such~eelgnators can be decompoeed into parts in
Buch a way that every part is to be evaluated in a different
environment.
For the sake of completeness of the discuseion Jt ehould be /
mentioned that pronoune can be intepreted as a special kind of
proper namee, which reąuire fiX1ng the reference again and again
for almost every occurence ot a pronoun.
Intensionalityand multiple environments
We will diecusB several examplee of inteneionality and observe
when and how the value ot a eentence is changed by a denetatlon
preserving substitutlon.
(26) .The comm1esioner met the chairman ot the hospi"tal board.
(27) The commissioner met Jones. .
(28) Smith met the chairman ot the hospital board~
l29) Smith met Jones.
Assuming that Saith is the commiesioner and Jones is the chairman
of the hospital.board, we have above the reeults of denotation
preserving &~bstitution5. If the sender knows the names of the
commissioner and the chairman, the alI the utterances carry the
same-information about the sender. If the addreseee truets the
sender, then he updates his beliefs to be in accord with the
state of affairs represented bY the utterance. For the purpose
or updating he evaluates'the utterance, in particular its
designators. If he knows that Smith is the comm1ssioner, then
both "SInith" and "the cOmmissloner" evaluate ~ Sm!th; .
- 1~ _
therefore e.g. (26) and (28) are for him equivalent.
Analogically, if he knows that Jones ls the chairman of the
hospi tal boa.rd, then e.g. (26) and ~27J are for him equi valent.
The Quine's example
(30) T~e comm1ssioner -is looking for the cha±rman of the
hospltal board.
is more compl1cated due to the two readings of the verb "look fo~".
One of them I call objectlve; lt means "to perform an action
aimed at finding an object". I call the second reading subjective;
it means "to intend to find,an object",·and this requires that
the person in question has a mental image or the object looked
for; but it doea not presuppose the existence ef the object.
Accoroing to the first reading (30) ancf (.31)
. (31) The commissloner is leoking for the dean.
are equivalent as long as both the sender and the addressee know
that the chairman·is the dean. A6cordlng to the second reading
the utterances (30) and (31) are obviously different, because
looking for anybody who ia the dean is ouite different from
looking for a~vbody who is the chairman of the hospital board.
Our next example ls
(32) Phillp believes that the capi tal ~f Honduras 15 in
Nicaragua.
Here we have-to consider three environments: the beliefs of
the sender, the beliefs ot the addressee and the beliets of Fhilip,
The pivot of the main clause, i.e. "belleves", is to be evaluated
primarl1y in the sender's environment and secondarily ln the
environment of the addreasee, and the pivot ot the subordinate
clause is to be evaluated in the Phlllp envlronment. The choice. .
of the sui table environment for the designators 1s'.much more
complicated. The utterance, (32) may be intended to mean that
Pbil1p reallses what ls Honduras and what is a capltal, but
nevertheles8 he belleves ~hat the capltal ot Honduras is in
Nicaragua because of bis erroneous beliefs about Nicaragua.
On the other hand, Philip may know what is licaragua and what
is a capi tal, b.lt he may know nothing about Honduras, and
therefore he may see no contrad1ctlon in his belief. The next
possibility la that Pbillp believea that Tegucigalpa is in
Nicaragua. but he do es not know that it is the capital of
Honduras wbile the sender, on the contrary, does not remember
the name of the capital of·Honduras but he knows that Phillp
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believes thie town t,o be 'in Nicaragua. There ar,e still some
poseibilities left, but it ie enough to see what they come trom.
AlI the difterent interpretatione dlscussed above are derived by
different ways of evaluating,the designators. The first interpre-
tation assumes that "the capltal ot Honduras" 'ie evaluated in the
Phil~p's environment, what presuPpos~8'the respective knowledge'
on the part of Phillp, and the proper name "Nlcaragua" in the
sender's environment;' in consequence, the Philip's environment
need not contaln the knowledge that Nlcaragua ls a country.
Next, we can assume that "the capi tal ot Honduras" is divided
between twa environments and to evaluate "the capi tal of" in the
Philip environment and the "Honduras" in the sender's environment;
respectively, the Philip's environment'need not contaln the know-
ledge that-Honduras is a country. Next, we can evaluate the whole
l'hrase "the capi tal of Honduras" in the sender e~vironment etc.
Obviously, some of the lnterpretations are more natural ~han
others; out df context, those two interpretations are particularly
preferred,which are equlvalent to the "de re" and "de dict~" inter-
pretatiqns. Our next and the las t examples are the Ajdakiewicz's
sentences
l33) Caesar knew that the capi tal of the Republic lies on the
(34)
Tiber.
Caesar
Tiber.
knew that the capital of the Popes lies on the
Because "know" ls a factive ver'b, the pivot of the Bubordinate
cla::lseis to be evaluated in both the environment ot Caesar and
the sender. There are several possibilities for evaluating the
designa~ors, ~~t alI the possibilities which aSBume the ,evalua-
tion of "the Popes" in the environment of Caesar are bound to
faU because "Popes" simply lack any meaning in the Caem's
environment.
Conclusions
I hope tó,have shown,that the earlier treatment ot the
intensionality was too simplicistic. In fact, an utterance t~~en
out of cont~xt has practically always several interpretations.
Their number depends not only on the number of designators and ,
the number of environments available for the evaluation ót des1-
gnators (these tactors were recognised already by Montague) , but
also on the com-pleti ty of designatores.
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The proble~ is obscured by the fact that we rarely disc~ss' ar.
utterance really out ot conteY-t. Usually we assume tna~ it is
uttered by an adult with a ~pical cultural background etc.
SQch implicit assumptifnś rule out some interpretations and
~a~~e some interpretations to collapse into single eadings
lit Borne ot them happen to be incorrect, usually a misunderstanding
occurs). Nevertheless, trem the theoretical as well as from the
practlcal~olnt ot vlew all the posslble interp!etations should
-be taken lnto account •.
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